CONTENTS

Background
Pre-crisis Development
Full Blown International Crisis
    Moroccan Green March
    Nouakchott I
    Nouakchott II
    French Hostages in Mauritania
    Tan Tan
    Goulimime-Tarfaya Road
    Operation Imam
    Galtat Zemmour I
    Sand Wall
    Galtat Zemmour II
Efforts for Peaceful Settlement by UN and OAU
Establishment of MINURSO
    Cease-fire
    Voters Registration
    Recent Developments
Conclusion
Appendix A
    United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara
Bibliography

Background(Back to Contents)
Africa's last colony' was an unfortunate distinction attributed to Namibia until its independence in 1990. The title was subsequently inherited by Western Sahara. [2] One of the most inhospitable places on Earth, the ex-Spanish territory of Western Sahara might seem the least likely track of real estate to be coveted by anyone. Yet this bleak land on the western edge of the great Saharan desert has been the theatre of Africa’s bitter and intractable wars since 1975-76, when it was abruptly abandoned by Spain. [11]

Western Sahara lies between Morocco and Mauritania on the northwest coast of Africa. An Arid coastal plain with little agriculture rises to meet the western edge of the Sahara Desert. Phosphate mines in the northwestern part of the territory are its principle economic resource. Sparsely populated, its 264,000 kilometers are home to largely nomadic population of 186,000, more than 60,000 are refugees, living in camps in southwestern Algeria. The Territory’s basic demographics are grim: infant mortality 18%, life expectancy 40, literacy 15%, population growth 2.8, producing a population structure with a majority under the age of 20. [19] [8]

As Spain belatedly lost faith in its colonial “mission,” in 1974-75, the Saharawi nationalists were destined, however, to face new enemies. The Moroccan occupation of Western Sahara was not spurred, as many observers have assumed, by simple lust for its phosphate. Rather an ideology of territorial expansion, founded on the ideal of recreating a supposed “Greater Morocco” of pre-colonial times, was deeply rooted in the Moroccan psyche. [18] Fashioned by Moroccan nationalist in the fifties, this ideology had been appropriated by the monarchy, which consequently laid claim to Mauritania for the first nine years of its independence (1960-69) and briefly went to war with Algeria in 1963, in pursuit of a claim to much of the Algerian Sahara. The ground- swell of nationalist fever in Morocco in 1974-75, which reached its highest peak with the “Green March” in November 1975, was cleverly orchestrated by a king who saw no better way to outmaneuver his domestic opponents and restabilize a regime that had been shaken by serious challenges, including two narrowly unsuccessful coup in 1971-72. [11]
 

Pre-crisis Development(Back to Contents)
The United Nations has considered the situation in the Territory since 1963. Over the years, the General Assembly reaffirmed the right of the people of Western Sahara to self-determination, and called on the administering power to take steps to ensure the realization of that right. In response to a request by the General Assembly for an advisory opinion, the International Court of Justice concluded in 1975 that the materials and information presented to it showed the existence, at the time of Spanish colonization, of legal ties of allegiance between the Sultan of Morocco and some of the tribes living in the Territory. They equally showed the existence of rights, including some rights relating to the land, which constituted legal ties between Mauritania and the Territory. Nevertheless, they did not establish any tie of territorial sovereignty between Western Sahara and Morocco or Mauritania. Thus the Court did not find legal ties of such a nature as to affect the application of the 1960 General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) in the decolonization of Western Sahara and, in particular, of the principle of self-determination. [1] [7]

The above conclusions reached by the International Court of Justice at the Hague in its advisory opinion on the Western Sahara issue are by now well known to most observers and commentators. However, the significance of the fact that the Court was asked to intervene in an issue which, originally at least, appeared to be simply one of decolonization has not been widely considered. Some observers, however, have implied that the Court’s involvement in the issue arose in large measure because of the United Nations unwillingness to apply established principles regarding colonization [12]

On 14 Nov 1975, Morocco, Spain and Mauritania announced the results of secret negotiation to partition Saharan territory between Morocco and Mauritania while permitting Spain to keep a large minority interest in Saharan phosphate production. [19] Also in 1975, Spain, Morocco and Mauritania agreed upon a Declaration of Principles by which Spain confirmed its resolve to decolonize the Territory by 28 February 1976. Under that agreement, Spain would institute a temporary administration in which Morocco and Mauritania would participate, in collaboration with the Jema'a (a local assembly set up by Spain in 1967) expressing the views of the Saharan population.  [1]
 

Full Blown International Crisis(Back to Contents)
Toward the end of November 1975, Moroccan forces invaded the territory from northeast and Mauritanian troops invaded from south. By Feb 1976, when Spanish formally withdrew, the two armies were in control of most of Saharan territory. The defacto annexation was formalized by the Rabat agreement of April 1976, which assigned two-third of the territory to Morocco and one-third to Mauritania. [19]

Spain completed its withdrawal on 26 February 1976, stating that, although it did not consider that the people of Western Sahara had exercised their right to self-determination, it considered itself released from international responsibility towards the Territory. On 27 February, the Secretary General received a message, through Morocco, from the President of the Jema'a informing him that the Jema'a had approved the "reintegration" of the Territory with Morocco and Mauritania.[1]

The Popular Front for the Liberation of Saguia el-Hamra and Rio de Ore (POLISARIO), organized in 1973 to resist Spanish control, and Algeria opposed the arrangement, maintaining that the Jema'a had not been democratically elected. [19] Therefore, on the same day, another body, the pro-polisario Provisional Sahrawi National Council, proclaimed the founding of an independent state, the "Saharan Arab Democratic Republic" (SADR), and stated that it would engage in an armed struggle to achieve the right of self-determination of the people of the Territory.[1]

By then, serious fighting had broken out between the Frente polisario forces and the Moroccan and Mauritanian armed forces. Part of the Saharan population left the Territory to follow the Frente polisario and settle in camps in the Tindouf area of southwestern Algeria. [1]

Having suffered badly in conventional warfare, polisario switched to hit and run guerrilla tactics, concentrating first on Mauritania. Strained by the cost of war, following a change of Government, Mauritania in 1979 signed a peace agreement in Algiers with the Frente polisario by which it renounced all claims to Western Sahara. Morocco declared the accord null and void, and Moroccan troops took over the Mauritanian sector of Western Sahara. The Frente polisario stepped up its attacks on Moroccan forces, and fighting in the Territory continued in the following years. [1]

Morocco has been enmeshed in protracted conflict with the polisario movement, supported by Algeria, over the territory of Western Sahara since 1975. There have been ten international crises during this conflict, as follows. [13]

01) Moroccan Green March, in 1975-76: Spain and Morocco, and later, Algeria and Mauritania were the direct participants in a two stage crisis over Western Sahara that lasted from 16 October 1975 to 14 April 1976. [14]

02) Nouakchott I, in 1976: A polisario attack on Mauritania’s capital, which caused a one-day crisis for Mauritania on 8 June 1976. [15]

03) Nouakchott II, in 1977: A second polisario attack on Mauritania’s capital, on 3 July 1977, precipitated another crisis for Mauritania lasting until late that month [15]

04) French Hostages in Mauritania, in 1977: As a part of on going conflict over Western Sahara, French citizens working in Mauritania were held hostage by polisario. This created a crisis for France and Algeria from 25 October to 23 December 1977. [13]

05) Tan Tan, in 1979: A polisario attack on Moroccan town of Tan Tan triggered a crisis for Morocco on 28 January 1779. The crisis faded in March of that year. [15]

06) Goulimime-Tarfaya Road, in 1979: A large-scale polisario military operation inside Moroccan territory, on the strategic Goulimime-Tarfaya road, triggered a crisis for Morocco and Algeria from 1 to 25 June 1979. [13]

07) Operation Imam, in1980: A crisis for Morocco was triggered on 1 March 1980 when polisario forces reportedly defeated units from Morocco’s Zegalla column dispatched to clear the area of Oued Draa in the north to wards the Western Sahara frontier with Morocco. [16]

08) Galtat Zemmour I, in 1981: Morocco experienced a crisis on 13 October 1981 by a large scale attack – 3,000 troops, tanks, and armored personnel carriers—on its garrison at Galtat Zemmour, 25 miles from the border with Mauritania. [13]

09) Sand Wall, in 1987: In mid April 1987 the new Moroccan sand wall impinged on Mauritania’s territorial integrity. Since polisario forces would be obliged to pass through Mauritania in order to reach the Atlantic Ocean. This development catalyzed a crisis for Mauritania and, as a spill over effect, for Algeria as well. This crisis lasted from 25 February to 4 may 1987. [13]

10) Galtat Zemmour II, in 1989: On 7 October 1989 the polisario Front broke the truce with an attack on Moroccan positions at Galtat Zemmour, its major offensive since September 1988. Another major attack occurred four days later. And despite the reconciliation between Morocco and Algeria in May 1988, Algeria continued to provide diplomatic support to polisario. Thus the renewed fighting also posed a danger to the incipient accommodation between Algeria and Morocco. [13]
 

Efforts for Peaceful Settlement by UN and OAU(Back to Contents)
Besides the United Nations, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) became involved in seeking a peaceful settlement. In 1979, OAU called for a referendum so that the people of the Territory might exercise their right to self-determination. It established a committee to work out the modalities in cooperation with the United Nations. At the 1981 summit of OAU, the King of Morocco announced that he was prepared to agree to a cease-fire and to a referendum under international supervision. Welcoming the announcement, the summit called for a cease-fire and a referendum to be held in cooperation with the United Nations. [1] [19]

In 1985, Secretary General Javier Pérez de Cuéllar, in cooperation with the Chairman of the OAU Assembly of Heads of State and Government, initiated a joint mission of good offices. Some three years later, on 11 August 1988, the Secretary General and the Special Envoy of the Chairman presented, in separate meetings, to Morocco and the Frente polisario a document referred to as "the settlement proposals". The document, to which the two parties agreed in principle on 30 August 1988, contained proposals for a just and definitive solution of the question of Western Sahara in conformity with General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV). [1] [9]

The Security Council then adopted resolution 621 (1988) of 20 September 1988 authorizing the appointment of a special representative. On 27 June 1990, the Security Council, in its resolution 658 (1990), approved a report of the Secretary General containing the full text of the settlement proposals and an outline of the Secretary General's plan for implementing those proposals. The implementation plan provided for a transitional period during which the Special Representative of the Secretary General would have exclusive responsibility over all matters relating to the referendum, including its organization and conduct. The Special Representative would be assisted in his tasks by an integrated group of United Nations civilian, military and civilian police personnel. This group would be known as the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO). The civilian component would range in size from about 800 to 1,000 personnel, depending on the requirements of the various phases of the transitional period. At full strength, the military component would consist of approximately 1,700 personnel, and the security unit of about 300 police officers. [1] [5]

Furthermore the ‘implementation plan’ outlined that the transitional period would begin with the coming into effect of a cease-fire and end with the proclamation of the results of the referendum. Following the announcement of a cease-fire MINURSO would

- Verify the reduction of Moroccan troops in the Territory

- Monitor the confinement of Moroccan and Frente Polisario troops to designated locations

- Take steps with the parties to ensure the release of all Western Saharan political prisoners or detainees

- Oversee the exchange of prisoners of war; implement the repatriation program

- Identify and register qualified voters

- Organize and ensure a free referendum

- Proclaim the results.

Morocco was prepared to reduce its troops in the Territory to a level not exceeding 65,000 all ranks, within a period of 11 weeks from the beginning of the transitional period. This was accepted by the United Nations as an appropriate, substantial and phased reduction in accordance with the settlement proposals. All remaining Moroccan troops were to be located in static or defensive positions along the sand wall, known as the berm, with limited exceptions. MINURSO military observers were to monitor these troops and, towards this end, were to be co-located with Moroccan sub-sector headquarters and with the Moroccan support and logistics units remaining elsewhere in the territory. MINURSO military observers were to conduct extensive patrols by land and air to ensure observance of the cease-fire and the confinement of the Moroccan troops to the designated locations. In addition, they were to monitor the custody of certain arms and ammunition. [19]

The Special Representative was to designate the locations to which Frente Polisario troops would be confined, with their arms, ammunition and military equipment. MINURSO military observers were to be deployed at each of the designated locations in order to monitor the Frente Polisario troops. The plan specified that an independent jurist, appointed by the Secretary General, was to take steps in cooperation with the parties to ensure the release of all Saharan political prisoners and detainees before the beginning of the referendum campaign. [9]
 
All Saharans counted in a 1974 census taken by the Spanish authorities and aged 18 years or over were to have the right to vote in the referendum. The plan provided for an Identification Commission, set up by the Secretary General in consultation with OAU, to be responsible for reviewing the 1974 census and updating it. It also provided for the establishment of a Referendum Commission to assist the Special Representative in the organization and conduct of the referendum. [5]

As an integral part of the MINURSO operation, the repatriation program for those Western Saharans who were identified as eligible to vote in the referendum and who wished to return to the Territory was to be carried out by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). UNHCR's task was to be threefold: [6]

- Ascertain and record the repatriation wishes of each Western Saharan as he or she was registered as a voter by the Identification Commission.

- Issue the necessary documentation to the members of his or her immediate family.

- Establish and manage, in cooperation with MINURSO, which would provide security, the reception centers that would be established in the Territory for the returnees.
 

Establishment of MINURSO(Back to Contents)
On 29 April 1991, the Security Council, in its resolution 690 (1991), decided to establish MINURSO. It was envisaged that the transitional period would begin no later than 16 weeks after the General Assembly approved the MINURSO budget and would last for 20 weeks. MINURSO would remain in the Territory for up to 26 weeks from the coming into effect of the cease-fire. The Secretary General indicated, however, that the periods of time allowed for the various processes were estimates that could require adjustment. [4] [1]
 

Cease-fire
On 24 May 1991, the Secretary General proposed that the cease-fire should enter into effect on 6 September 1991. Both parties accepted that date. It became clear that, notwithstanding the parties’ earlier acceptance of the settlement plan, substantial areas of difference between them remained. Meanwhile, hostilities had broken out in the Territory, interrupting an informal cease-fire that had been in effect for over two years. The number of military observers was subsequently increased to 228, and certain logistics and administrative support staff were also sent to the field.

The primary function of MINURSO was restricted to verifying the cease-fire and cessation of hostilities. This was done by direct observation of military forces and activities carried out by either party and by verifying complaints of alleged cease-fire violations. United Nations military observers were deployed to ten team sites/observation posts in the northern and southern sectors of the Territory to monitor the cease-fire in mobile patrols. Helicopter-borne patrols were also conducted to enhance MINURSO monitoring capability. [4] [2]

The headquarters of the Mission was established in the capital, Laayoune, with two regional headquarters in the northern and southern sectors of the Territory. A liaison office was also established in Tindouf to maintain contact with the Algerian authorities and the Frente Polisario.
 

Voters Registration
According to the settlement plan, the referendum in Western Sahara should have taken place in January 1992. While both Morocco and the Frente polisario reiterated their confidence in the United Nations, their commitment to the settlement plan and their willingness to restore the momentum of the peace process, they continued to have divergent views and different interpretations of some of the key elements contained in the plan. [3]

On 25 March 1992, Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali informed the Security Council of the appointment of Sahabzada Yaqub-Khan as the new Special Representative. In the hope to break the deadlock, the Special Representative held, in August and September 1992, a series of separate talks with the two parties on the interpretation and application of the criteria. [17]

The Special Representative then initiated consultations with the parties on a possible compromise regarding the interpretation and application of the criteria. Discussions were also held with the parties on a number of issues relating to an early registration of voters. After both sides confirmed their desire to proceed promptly with the registration of voters and to cooperate with MINURSO in this regard, it was decided to establish an Identification Commission for the Referendum in Western Sahara. On 23 April 1993, the Secretary General appointed Mr. Erik Jensen (Malaysia) as Chairman of the Commission. [1]

The Chairman of the Commission visited the mission area from 2 to 13 January 1994 for consultations with the parties and the neighboring countries on the situation and ways of resolving the remaining difficulties. He provided assurances to allay the concerns of the Frente Polisario that, on the basis of the compromise, thousands of individuals foreign to the Territory might be included in the electorate. These assurances were confirmed and further elaborated in a letter dated 4 February 1994 from the Special Representative to the representative of the Frente Polisario in New York.

  But, the parties continued to have fundamentally divergent positions on the establishment of the electorate. One party, Morocco, wanted to make all Saharans eligible to participate in the referendum, while the other, the Frente Polisario, wanted to limit participation, so far as possible, to those counted in the Territory in the 1974 census, in order to avoid including those it regarded as foreign to the Territory. The delegations of Morocco and the Frente Polisario met from 17 to 19 July 1993 at Laayoune, in the presence of the Special Representative as United Nations observer. In view of on going efforts in mission area, on 29 March 1994, the Security Council, by its resolution 907 (1994), agreed to the course of action that the Identification Commission should continue its work while the United Nations continued its efforts to obtain the cooperation of both parties. [1]
 
On 23 June 1995, the Frente Polisario announced that it was suspending its participation in the identification process and was withdrawing its observers. This was in protest against the sentencing by Morocco of eight Saharans to prison terms of 15 to 20 years for having participated in a demonstration in Laayoune, and the announcement by Morocco to the Council mission of its intention to present for identification 100,000 applicants residing outside the Territory. The identification operation resumed in late July, after the details concerning its resumption had been clarified and practical measures taken to reopen the centers.

As of early September 1995, a total of over 53,000 persons in the Territory and in the refugee camps near Tindouf had been identified since the process began. However, the Frente Polisario continued to dismiss categorically the 100,000 applications from persons living outside the Territory in southern Morocco. Frente Polisario had major reservations about members of certain tribal groupings also in the Territory, namely the "Tribus del Norte", "Tribus Costerasy del Sur" and "Chorfa". [1] From among these, they rejected three groups as in no sense "belonging to the Territory". With respect to other groups the Frente Polisario agreed to participate in identification on the assumption that the number would be modest and the individuals would be identified by one sheikh from each side. The Government of Morocco, on the other hand, was insistent that there should be no discrimination between applicants, irrespective of whether they were currently residing in or outside the Territory and irrespective of the criterion under which they applied to be included in the electoral roll. As of 18 November 1995, 233,487 applications had been processed. [4]
 
 
Recent Developments
Since autumn 1996, a new opportunity has arisen for open and direct talks between the Kingdom of Morocco and the Frente Polisario to resolve their dispute. Contacts between the two parties were renewed and both the UN General Assembly (UNGA) and Security Council (UNSC) have called for continued dialogue. More recently, a major step forward was taken with the appointment in March 1997 of former US Secretary of State, James A. Baker III - and with him the implicit authority of the US - as UN Secretary General Kofi Annan's Special Envoy for the mission. Unparalleled since MINURSO's deployment, the naming of such a prominent representative provides the best, if still limited, chance for relaunching the peace process.

If this fragile momentum is to last and produce results, it will need the support of legitimate multilateral fora like the UNGA and UNSC. However, direct and active engagement by UN member-states will also be needed, if the proposed referendum on independence succeeds, for the results to be accepted by each side, or if it fails, to avoid a resumption of hostilities. The UN's role needs to be underwritten by the kind of effectiveness that only US authority can provide. A code of conduct for the parties is also indispensable. Finally, an overall joint monitoring mechanism - a characteristic feature of peace-maintenance - could help guarantee the legitimacy and effectiveness of the settlement terms already accepted by Morocco and Frente Polisario.

This prompt action, coming so soon after his election, indicated the issue's priority on Annan's agenda. He reaffirmed that `from a technical point of view, it is entirely possible to resume and finish identification', while adding that progress is possible `only if both sides commit themselves fully, in deed as well as in word, to implementing the settlement plan'. [2]

Suddenly, on 17 March, former US Secretary of State Baker was appointed as Annan's Special Envoy for Western Sahara. Frente Polisario and Morocco were mystified. Why had Baker been chosen? Stranger still, why had he accepted? Was Baker the man Annan intended to save or finally end the costly peace process - as implied by Annan's third question above? In a press statement, Baker explained that he was to reassess the conflict and explore all viable options that might bridge the current impasse, including implementing the present settlement plan.

Under the auspices of the Personal Envoy, a series of direct talks was held between the parties to address the obstacles in the implementation of the plan and assess its implementability. Given the goodwill and spirit of cooperation shown during the talks, held in London, Lisbon and Houston (Texas) the main contentious issues that had impeded the implementation of the plan were satisfactorily addressed. By September 1997, with the successful completion of the last round, the Secretary General reported that all the agreements reached during the talks had taken effect. He therefore recommended that MINURSO proceed with the implementation of the plan, starting with the completion of the identification process.

On 20 October 1997, the Security Council, in its resolution 1133 (1997), decided to extend MINURSO's mandate until 20 April 1998. It requested the Secretary General to begin the identification of eligible voters with the aim of finishing the process by 31 May 1998 and to submit no later than 15 November 1997 a comprehensive report, including a detailed plan, a timetable and financial implications, for the holding of the Referendum for the self-determination of the people of Western Sahara in accordance with the Settlement Plan and the agreements reached between the parties for its implementation.  [2]

It remains to be seen whether Baker can marshal his coalition-building skills to establish a joint guaranteeing mechanism. He at least brought the implicit authority of Washington to the process, as well as the explicit support of the Clinton administration. It was thus significant that in London on I 1-12 June, Baker convened the parties and the Algerian and Mauritanian governments as 'observers' to consider how to implement the settlement plan. The meeting was organized with the United Kingdom Foreign and Commonwealth Office, thereby engaging a largely impartial state, a permanent five member and representative of European interests.

Conclusion(Back to Contents)
The current momentum may be the last chance to resolve the Western Saharan conflict peacefully. The fragile political will that has been expressed in the last year requires some machinery to give it effect. Without a joint framework and code of conduct, attention and support will evaporate; the necessary commitment from the UNSC will not be harnessed. With each renewal of MINURSO's mandate, the UNSC, and particularly the US, has threatened to terminate the mission in the absence of significant results. MINURSO will not be reviewed and reinvigorated. The barrel of the gun, and not the ballot, will be regarded by Polisario as the only means of self-determination.
 

APPENDIX  A(Back to Contents)
United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO)

LOCATION, Western Sahara
HEADQUARTERS, Laayoune
DURATION, April 1991 to present
 
AUTHORIZATION
Security Council resolutions:
690 (1991) of 29 April 1991
907 (1994) of 29 March 1994
973 (1995) of 13 January 1995
995 (1995) of 26 May 1995
1002 (1995) of 30 June 1995
1017 (1995) of 22 September 1995
1042 (1996) of 31 January 1996 1056 (1996) of 29 May 1996
1084 (1996) of 27 November 1996
1108 (1997) of 22 May 1997
1131 (1997) of 29 September 1997
1133 (1997) of 20 October 1997
1148 (1998) of 26 January 1998
 
SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVES OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL AND HEADS OF MISSION
Charles Dunbar (United States), February 1998 to date
Erik Jensen (Malaysia) [Acting], August 1995 to February 1998
Sahabzada Yaqub-Khan (Pakistan), March 1992 to August 1995
Johannes Manz (Switzerland), January 1990 to March 1992
Hector Gros Espiell (Uruguay),October 1988 to January 1990

PERSONNAL ENVOY OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL
James A. Baker III (United States) March 1997 to date

FORCE COMMANDERS
Major-General Bernd S. Lubenik (Austria), August 1997 to date
Major-General Jorge Barroso de Moura (Portugal), Nov. 1996 to July 1997
Major-General José Eduardo Garcia Léandro (Portugal), April to November 1996
Brigadier-General André Van Baelen (Belgium), Oct. 1992 to March 1996
Brigadier-General Luis Block Urban (Peru) [Acting],  April to September 1992
Major-General Armand Roy (Canada),  June 1991 to April 1992

POLICE COMMISSIONERS
Chief Superintendant Peter Miller (Canada), November 1997 to date 
Lieutenant-Colonel Jan H. Kleven (Norway) [Acting], July 1996 to May 1997 
Brigadier-General Walter Fallmann (Austria) January to July 1996
Lieutenant-Colonel Jan Walmann (Norway) [Acting],  August 1995 to Jan. 1996
Colonel Wolf-Dieter Krampe (Germany),  March 1995 to Aug. 1995
Colonel Jürgen Friedrich Reimann (Germany),  June 1993 to March 1995

STRENGTH
On 31 January 1998: 202 military observers, 78 civilian police and 21 military support personnel supported by international and local civilian staff.
Original authorization:  Approximately 1,700 military observers and troops, 300 civilian police and about 800 to 1,000 other civilian personnel

FATALITIES
Total: 7
1 military observer
3 other military personnel
1 civilian police
2 international UN staff
 

CONTRIBUTORS OF CIVILIAN POLICE PERSONNEL
Austria, June 1993 to June 1997, civilian police
Belgium, June to December 1993, civilian police
Canada, November 1997 to date, civilian police
Egypt, April 1995 to April 1996, December, 1997 to date, civilian police
Germany, June 1993 to August 1996, civilian police
Ghana, March 1995 to April 1996,December, 1997 to date, civilian police
Hungary, March 1995 to June 1997, civilian police
India, December 1997 to date, civilian police
Ireland, May 1995 to March 1996, civilian police
Malaysia, June 1993 to July 1995, December 1997 to date, civilian police
Nigeria, August 1994 to April 1996,December 1997 to date, civilian police
Norway, July 1994 to June 1997, civilian police
Pakistan, November 1997 to date, civilian police
Portugal, November 1997 to date, civilian police
Sweden, December 1997 to date, civilian police
Togo, June 1993 to June 1997, civilian police
Uruguay, April 1994 to June 1997, civilian police
 
CONTRIBUTORS OF MILITARY PERSONNEL
Argentina, September 1991 to date, military observers
Australia, May 1991 to May 1994, military observers
    May 1991 to May 1994, signals unit
Austria, September 1991 to date, military observers
Bangladesh, September 1991 to date, military observers
Belgium, Sep. 1992 to March 1996, military observers
Canada, May 1991 to June 1994, military observers
    May 1991 to June 1994, movement control unit
China, September 1991 to date, military observers
Egypt, September 1991 to date, military observers
El Salvador, January 1995 to date, military observers
Finland, Oct. to November 1991, military observers
France, September 1991 to date military observers
Ghana, September 1991 to date, military observers
    June 1994 to date, troops (clerical unit)
Greece, September 1991 to date, military observers
Guinea, September 1991 to date, military observers
Honduras, September 1992 to date, military observers
    January to October 1994, movement control unit
Ireland, September 1991 to date, military observers
Italy, September 1991 to date, military observers
Kenya, September 1991 to date, military observers
Malaysia, September 1991 to date, military observers
Nigeria, September 1991 to date, military observers
Pakistan, September 1991 to date, military observers
Peru, Sep.1991 to Sep. 1992, military observers
Poland, September 1991 to date, military observers
Portugal, March 1996 to date, military observers
Republic of Korea, August 1994 to Oct. 1996, military observers
    August 1994 to date, medical unit
Russian Federation (USSR before 1991),  September 1991 to date, military observers
Switzerland, May 1991 to August 1994, medical unit
    May to August 1994, military observers
Tunisia,  Sep. 1991 to June 1997, military observers
United Kingdom,  Sep. 1991 to Dec. 1993, military observers
United States, September 1991 to date, military observers
Uruguay, June 1994 to date, military observers
Venezuela, September 1991 to date, military observers
 

FINANCING
Estimated expenditures from inception to 30 June 1997, as at 31 January 1997- $256,317,200 (gross)
Budget appropriation 1 July 1997 through 30 June 1998- $30,229,800 (gross)
Proposed additional requirements requested due to the resumption of the identification process- $17,849,100 (gross)

 
VOLUNTARY CONTRIBUTIONS
Algeria, accommodation premises, office space, fuel, food, water for hygiene facilities, transport and laundry facilities
Australia, signals unit and communications equipment until May 1994
Mauritania, office space
Morocco, accommodation premises, office space, fuel, food, water for hygiene facilities, air and land transportation, transport workshop, trucks and personnel
Frente Polisario, accommodation premises, office space, food, water for hygiene facilities, technical personnel and other staff
Switzerland, aircraft in support of the medical unit and 30 support personnel until June 1994

Reproduced from reference [10]
 

Bibliography(Back to Contents)

01.  United Nations document, Department of Public Information, “United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO)” file:///www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/minurs_b.html, 13 February 1998.

02.  Chopra, J. “A Chance for Peace in Western Sahara” Survival, Vol. 39, No. 3, Autumn 1997, pp. 51-65

03.  Wikinson, P., and Rinaldo, R. “Principles for the Conduct of Peace Support Operations (PSO) ” United Nations Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR), 1996.

04.  United Nations document, Department of Public Information, “United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO)” file:///www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/minurs_p.html, 13 December  1997.

05.  United Nations document, Department of Public Information, “United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO)” file:///www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/minurs_r.html, 13 January  1998.

06.  United Nations Security Council Resolution, “The Situation Concerning Western Sahara” S/RES/1133 (1997),
file:///www.un.org/plweb-cgi/idoc2.pl, 13 March1998.

07.  United Nations document, “Report of the Secretary General on The Situation Concerning Western Sahara” S/1997 /742/Add.1,
file:///www.un.org/Docs/sc/reports/1997/s1997743.html, 1 January 1998.

08.  United Nations document, “Report of the Secretary General on The Situation Concerning Western Sahara” S/1997 /742,
file:///www.un.org/Docs/sc/reports/1997/s1997742.html, 1 January 1998.

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